Friday, April 20, 2012

Common GET Parameters

Looking for data / client system information passed in GET parameters is a good way of discovering interesting and malicious transactions within your network.

The other day, I was blindly looking at transactions to uncategorized URLs in which there were GET parameters that appeared to be related to passing information about the client.  Needless to say, I found a number of controllers/infections using this method - but I also found things like surveillance system communication.  I thought it was interesting, so I wanted to list some of patterns that seemed successful.  Here are some of the examples that I used for pulling out some of these "interesting" transactions from a dumped logfile using grep (easily converted to a PCRE signature if you're willing to handle possible false-positives related to the pattern):

Looking for a client's MAC address passed in a parameter:

$ grep "=\([A-Fa-f0-9][A-Fa-f0-9][\:\-]\)\{5\}[A-Fa-f0-9][A-Fa-f0-9][^A-Fa-f0-9]" logfile

Several legitimate services pass the client's MAC address as a parameter, but what I was finding was that these too were pretty interesting transactions.

mywizton.com (soft-phone software) passes the client's MAC address as a parameter.  I also noticed what appeared to be some mobile applications pass this information back to the server over HTTP.

When you use KFC's Free Wifi hotspots, your MAC address is passed as a parameter:
/kfc_login.php?cmd=login&mac=xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx&ip=192.168.xxx.xxx&essid=KFC-FREE-WIFI&url=http://www.apple.com/library/test/success.html
It was also interesting to see the Apple "wispr" request used when connecting to the hotspot.

But most interestingly, I noticed traffic related to what appears to be a company's surveillance system from vctvision.com that appears have embedded web-clients, using WinHTTP to beaconing back over HTTP to its controller / storage array.  It is beaconing back the hardware/MAC address, camera status, IP, DVRName, and VNCPort.  Making a mental note to go back and look at the security of these types of surveillance systems (note: these transactions are not SSL encrypted).

Here is a redacted snippet of the GET request:
/xxxxxx_xxxxxx.php?UUID=xx-xx-xx-xx-xx-xx
&dwCameraStatus=xxxxx&version=x.x
&local_ip=192.168.xxx.xxx:xxxx
&global_ip=:xxxx
&DVRName=xxxxxxxxxx
&VNCPort=xxxx
&send_notify=0

However, I also did see several malicious requests using this MAC address filter.
One example I'll list here is:

down.92rmm.com/shell.asp?id=xxxxxx&mac=xx-xx-xx-xx-xx-xx&os=Windows+XP&ver=xxxxxxxx

It's an older (2009), QQ password stealing trojan (V/T report).  However, because it is so old and the site has since been taken down, it does not show up in a number of blacklists.

We can see that other parameters, such as "os" (operating system) are passed by this trojan.

Looking for client's OS passed in a parameter:

$ grep "[^A-Za-z0-9\-\_]\(OS\|os\)=" logfile

There were even more log results in my data-set having an "OS" parameter - it helped me to count-sort and get the top replayed transactions that had this parameter.

The top ones were all TDSS trojan related which we were already blocking:
Path:
/m.php?subid=x&pr=x&os=13&id=[removed]&ver=x

Also at the top were Gabpath Adware/Spyware transactions to:
secured-networks.com/gpupd.php?VER=xxxxxx&SubId=xx&OS=Windows NT Workstation 5.1 Buildnumber :  2600 Service Pack 3&mac=xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

But among other things, I also discovered a controller for a new (April 19) AutoRun worm:
yma.stripthere.com/mars/remote.php?os=W7&version=508&build=508&[removed]
txdad.stripthere.com/mars/remote.php?os=W7&version=508&build=508&[removed]
ttl.stripthere.com/mars/settings.cfg?build=508&os=W7&new=1

Needless to say, this is a successful approach at pulling out suspicious transactions- but there still is a lot of noise that you have to filter out.

Here are a handful of other filters that I built and played around with:

MAC Address without a separator:
$ grep "=\([A-Fa-f0-9][A-Fa-f0-9]\)\{6\}[^A-Fa-f0-9]" logfile

IP Address in parameter:
$ grep -i "=\([0-9]\{1,3\}\.\)\{3\}[0-9]\{1,3\}" logfile

Hardware UUID:
$ grep "=[A-Fa-f0-9]\{8\}\-\([A-Fa-f0-9]\{4\}\-\)\{3\}[A-Fa-f0-9]\{12\}" logfile
without separator:
$ grep "=[A-Fa-f0-9]\{8\}\([A-Fa-f0-9]\{4\}\)\{3\}[A-Fa-f0-9]\{12\}" logfile

CPU info:
$ grep -i "=\(x86\|I32\|I64\|Pentium\|Xeon\|Intel\)" logfile

Windows OS terms:
$ grep -i "=\(win\|xp\|w7\|5.1\|vista\)" logfile

Cheap and easy Base64 encoding:
$ grep "[^A-Za-z0-9\+\/][A-Za-z0-9\+\/]\{6,\}\=\=" logfile

Country code:
grep -i "=\(US\|UK\|IN\|AU\|FR\|CA\|MX\|DE\|CN\|CA\)&" logfile
(switch out with whatever are common locations of your hosts in your organization)

Proven, common botnet/malicious parameters:

Looking at an EmergingThreats (ET) ruleset, I pulled out signatures that look for specific parameters.

Here is the regex that I used if you want to replay for yourself / track this over time:

$ grep -o "content:\"[^\"]*\"" emerging-all.rules | grep -o "[A-Za-z0-9\-\_]*=" | sort | uniq -c | sort -n -r

Using this method, the top / most frequently seen parameters within ET at present are (the leading number is the number of times the parameter was seen in the ruleset):


Note that a number of the top parameter names are single character parameters, which too can be used as an indicator.  What are some parameters or parameter values that get you nervous when doing log analysis?

Saturday, March 31, 2012

Tracking an SMS Scam/Spam

This afternoon, I got an annoying SMS spam to my cell phone.

The message was from: (347) 618-9xxx
Stating:
You have been randomly selected for a Free New iPad 2. Get it now at:
www.apple.com.todayswinners.info/?id=[xxxxxxxxxx] !

(Someone needs to tell these guys that the iPad 3 is out)

These SMS spam messages even found there way as a topic of conversation on the Apple forums a few days ago – showing that this is a fairly active/annoying spam campaign.  



The 347 area code belongs to New York, and appears to be a heavily abused area code for this type of spam (reference).  The above particular number has a lookup to:
Carrier: BANDWIDTH.COM CLEC, LLC (OCN: 997E)
Location: Flushing, NY Queens

BANDWIDTH.COM provides a number of Internet-based communication services, such as, hosted VoIP, SIP trunking, and termination services:

  
www.apple.com.todayswinners.info has recent domain registration data:


Domain ID:D45814630-LRMS
Domain Name:TODAYSWINNERS.INFO
Created On:14-Mar-2012 21:30:15 UTC
Last Updated On:23-Mar-2012 23:13:10 UTC
Expiration Date:14-Mar-2013 21:30:15 UTC
Sponsoring Registrar:Moniker Online Services LLC (R245-LRMS)

Registrant Name:David Raleigh
Registrant Street1:2559 Philli Lane
Registrant City:tulsa
Registrant State/Province:OK
Registrant Postal Code:74119
Registrant Country:US
Registrant Phone:+1.9432900219
Registrant Email:Rebeccavgw@hotmail.com

And resolves to 60.190.218.123:

inetnum:        60.190.218.0 - 60.190.218.127
netname:        NINBO-LANZHONG-LTD
country:        CN
descr:          Ninbo Lanzhong Network Ltd

Other IPs in this /24 have been observed participating in this same type of spam, e.g., 60.190.218.20.

When the domain was first stood-up it and other related ones had initial DNS resolution through name servers on the domain: horryrentals.info, and is one of the name servers used by this scammer for setting up their domains.

horryrentals.info is an interesting nexus point:

Created On:31-May-2011 04:17:53 UTC
Last Updated On:21-Mar-2012 15:57:01 UTC
Expiration Date:31-May-2012 04:17:53 UTC
Sponsoring Registrar:eNom, Inc. (R126-LRMS)
Status:CLIENT TRANSFER PROHIBITED

Registrant ID:8FFBFEAEF102D2EE
Registrant Name:aaron stevens
Registrant Organization:just1
Registrant Street1:156 belmont ave
Registrant Street2:
Registrant Street3:
Registrant City:belair
Registrant State/Province:ca
Registrant Postal Code:90210
Registrant Country:US
Registrant Phone:+1.8848828383
Registrant Phone Ext.:
Registrant FAX:
Registrant FAX Ext.:
Registrant Email:lstalent1@aim.com  <--  interesting email with historical info

Looking into the email, shows an open-source post from back in 2008 tying it to a spammer / scammer / BP hoster “brand0n” aka “newbrand0nname” (reference, reference). There is a ton of open-source info on this scammer’s dealings dating back over 6 years ago, and it appears that even back then these similar style .info domains were favored by him (reference Google searches).  Back in 2007 someone was digging up info on him for being a nuisance on mafia-wars.com and had a number of details on him (reference) including his Charlotte, NC location (reference).

Looking at other domains that resolve(d) to the above IPs or used the previously mentioned name servers, show a history of these types of SMS spam domains.  About a 100 variations on Apple, BestBuy, iPad, Walmart, etc. hostnames on some of the below domains.  Auction, lottery, and other "crap" sites are commonly used by this spammer.  Here are a handful of some of the domains used by this spammer/scammer:

bestwinners1.org
prize-winners.info
todayswinners.info
winnersnow.info
youre-a-winner.net
bbcards.info
bestbuyscards.com
cards4unow.info
cardsbestbuy.info
click4card.info
click4cards.info
congratsuwon.info
gcards.info
getanipodnow.info
ipad4unow.info
ipadcardsnow.info
ipodcardsnow.info
todays-winners.com
winnerstoday.info
winnersshop.info
winwiners.info
bestiphone4.info
onlineauctionssite.info
pennyauctionscam.info
pennyauctionssite.info
poker-strategies.info
wisconsinlottery.info

Lesser Known Controllers (C&Cs)

We're currently interviewing job candidates for security research and data-mining (with an emphasis on threat detection within 'big-data'). When putting together a sample data-file for a candidate to analyze, I had some time to select some data that had some lesser known command and control (C&C) servers and beaconing patterns to get a feel for the candidate's analytic thought-process. This not surprisingly turned out to be an easy task -- there are so many botnet campaigns (old and new) that have C&Cs not listed in well-known blocklists and in some cases have very little open-source intelligence (OS-INT). Once I got going on this, it inspired me to put together this blog post with an emphasis on lesser known (or even unlisted) C&Cs. Note: since we do not have access to content data, in some cases I have to make assumptions based on behavior and reputation that something is indeed a C&C. I'm pushing this post to Scrapbook since this can be a work in progress and I want to encourage other analysts to chime in if they feel so compelled.

I have attempted to cluster and color-code C&Cs thought to be related to the same campaign.  I also didn't necessarily perform OS-INt searches for all of these, so some of these perhaps may be better known than others.  In any case here is a list of >50.

Possible C&CServer IPEvidenceOS-INT or Blocklist(s)
sonyvaio77.com79.137.226.94Suspicious beaconing observed,
Poor IP reputation

asus7.com79.137.226.94Same IP/DNS info as above
nokia66.com79.137.226.94Same IP/DNS info as aboveListed as connection point for generic banking trojan.
updawn4you.net84.net31.170.162.183Suspicious beaconing observed, POSTs to /update3/update.phpSimilar pattern in this generic Trojan sandbox report
ministerpokers.namedownSuspicious beaconing observed, POSTs to /blogs/index.phpIn Generic Trojan sandbox report
herdcave.ru208.115.203.138
124.133.228.122
217.24.246.7
Suspicious beaconing observed, POSTs to /wings.php and /paris.phpIP used in other Zeus C&C
www.fuoriserrone.biz62.149.140.183Suspicious beacons to /includes/guy.php
do-sul.de80.246.53.3Suspicious beacons to /includes/guy.php from same victim
www.sbo-wending.nl194.109.6.97Suspicious beacons to /plugins/system/guy.php from same victim
mastik756bombastik12.com78.41.201.103Suspicious beacons to /guy.php from same victim
cantst0pmenever22.net69.43.161.151Suspicious beacons to /run/fgt-my.php
geta11youhave.net69.43.161.164Suspicious beacons to /truth/fgt-my.php from same victim
look4profits1.net
Suspicious beacons to /yup/fgt-my.php from same victim
executivesuites.us64.119.182.89Suspicious beacons to /services/09.php
lilaussieprems.com180.235.128.13Suspicious beacons to /09.php from same victim
grz971.com94.63.147.45Suspicious beacons to /09.php from same victim
finewcreautomp.com69.43.161.157Suspicious beacons to /config.php
grounaxyxin.com69.43.161.154Suspicious beacons to /config.php from same victim
amersterin.com85.192.45.85Suspicious beacons to /1/redir.php
with-love.me87.255.51.229Suspicious beacons to /us/c.php
34af915b87be46e0967f7fe58ffb7272.com91.209.163.175Suspicious beacons to /binaries/check.php
platinumhd.tv223.27.3.163Suspicious beacons to /includes/games.phpZeus connection point
heart-station.org72.29.76.67Suspicious beacons to /ea.php
grz942.com199.2.137.141Suspicious beacons to /ea.php
wigowigote.com127.0.0.1Suspicious beacons to /robotx/index.php
web-site-pro28938.rudownSuspicious beacons to /statistics/stats.phpMalwareURL listing
wtfrpfm.comdownSuspicious beacons to /gate.php and /file.phpMcAfee report on password stealer
bigbadwolfluin.com141.136.16.115Suspicious beacons to /nsk/sgngs.phpMcAfee Generic Trojan report
neopoliticanso.su217.24.246.7Suspicious beacons to /zpl/nbsdus.php from same victim
nofrobvybeydo.netdownSuspicious beacons to /bbc/null.phpZeus connection point
cugnafytbehyupr.com174.34.164.99Suspicious beacons to /bbc/null.php from same victim
biukhpjwtgevaw.net82.165.35.54Suspicious beacons to /bbc/null.php from same victim
guhebupjwixvyw.net82.165.35.54Suspicious beacons to /bbc/null.php from same victim
runybtcoktwvad.net82.165.35.54Suspicious beacons to /bbc/null.php from same victim
wtgbojetgbpaqd.com82.165.35.54Suspicious beacons to /bbc/null.php from same victim
fairswaters.comdownSuspicious beacons to /max/null.php
makesnewimages.comdownSuspicious beacons to /max/null.php from same victim
watchersmovie.com82.165.35.54Suspicious beacons to /max/null.php from same victim
tonewuploader.com82.165.35.54Suspicious beacons to /max/null.php from same victim
nomorehidden.com82.165.35.54Suspicious beacons to /max/null.php from same victim
mycoolboots.com82.165.35.54Suspicious beacons to /max/null.php from same victim
184.22.105.126184.22.105.126Suspicious beacons to /88.php
184.22.190.100184.22.190.100Suspicious beacons to /88/88.php from same victim
mubezengie.rudownBeacons to /Images/oldone.jpg
iechaerije.rudownBeacons to /Images/oldone.jpg
eicasodahg.rudownBeacons to /Images/oldone.jpg
scroooodgemacdackl.orgdownBeacons to /foter.jpg
savetimeforyooooulife2013.netdownBeacons to /defalt.jpg
freejumpcoooomttell.comdownBeacons to /jkass78qw.jpg
freeeeesecuritysacheckname.netdownBeacons to /8saiu882jji.jpg
alabamatopsfreeeee.netdownBeacons to /jkass78qw.jpg
avaintellegeron.com199.2.137.141Beacons to /config.phpZeus
marsplus.com199.2.137.141Beacons to /foreach/das.phpZeus
ser.vailsx.com69.30.199.62Beacons to /index.phpZeus
fak.actcas.com69.30.199.62Beacons to /index.phpZeus
gsssoftware5.com199.2.137.141Beacons to /orders.phpZeus
bizimums.comBeacons to /orders.phpZeus
clanquack.ruBeacons to /qclouds.phpZeus
mamasun.orgBeacons to /HKD/gate43fr34t54gg.phpZeus
46.105.5.21546.105.5.215Beacons to /cp/cfg1.binZeus
bestwebrecords.ru8.15.7.117 63.251.179.13Beacons to /cfg/lks34bestwebrecords.jpgZeus
velawe.netBeacons to /cfg1.binZeus
landrilloj.netBeacons to /cfg1.binZeus
figurebs.netBeacons to /cfg1.binZeus
windyworld.ru87.242.73.219Beacons to /search/ussa1.binZeus
scarygroup.ru87.242.73.219Beacons to /search/assu08.binZeus
lumpybluff.ru87.242.73.219Beacons to /bmanpicy1.binZeus
prmifgfgd.dnsdojo.orgdownBeacons to /.../darknigh.exe


Perhaps we will create a feed in the future based on automated detection of highly suspicious beacons.

Monday, March 26, 2012

XX7R.COM Name Server


Recently observed HTTP POST beaconing to:
grblinux.com/in.asp
Likely a drop-zone for some malware.

There is not much available in the open-source on this specific domain, besides a March 22nd report showing that the domain is resolved during execution of a sample with MD5:
78e07ae16c06b4ead0b7f3075c277a8a
This particular sample has very poor A/V detection: 2/43. And from the report it appears that it is a dropper for another sample: 80230bfac2cb9e9c078eb505e83898f1 (unfortunately I do not see any reports for this particular MD5)

In any case, there is enough DNS information to tie this activity in with other possibly related badness.

By the way, the XX7R.COM nameserver used to resolve GRBLINUX.COM is open to DNS zone transfer:

Here is the domain information for the nameserver:

The "posy@mail13.com" email account used to register the nameserver domain has been tied to a number of FakeAV campaigns including:
From these samples, a longer list of related domains was generated based on connection points used:
boqupyvuru.com
cikojavif.com
cixizacakudyko.com
dihojocitiz.com
fuxuvugyvupi.com
gavywelugamoqe.com
horiqomep.com
kigutohigazem.com
lohyfyrasokiso.com
miferyciq.com
mijywujysa.com
mimopywyn.com
mobesinolacuke.com
nynigywuheqe.com
pinoguzeseme.com
posubudiqof.com
qobirawif.com
qulygimokine.com
rinysegaci.com
sesusihyt.com
teguwumefu.com
tucaxiqiwityp.com
vowoputaru.com
vyganison.com
wihasiwaji.com
xibyxanati.com
xybobimaholos.com
zujytuhehok.com

Passive DNS results for the XX7R.COM nameserver show a number of other related domains including:
atsdrivers.org (did not resolve - DNR)
atsdrvgt.org (DNR)
freshnewstoday.org (82.192.87.28)
games4win.org (sinkholed)
globalwebz.net (DNR)
grblinux.com (94.63.147.45)
grblinuxnew.com (DNR)
grz970.com (DNR)
grz971.com (sinkholed)
homelinuxinside.net (94.63.147.45)
jgscable.com (DNR)
jgscable.net (DNR)
jsadv.net (DNR)
muzonline.org (sinkholed)
pganalytics.net (DNR)
sonyvaio77.com (sinkholed)
wcgplaynow.org (sinkholed)

The domains sinkholed are parked by microsoftinternetsafety.net (way to go Microsoft!)

The netblocks used for those that remain up:
route: 94.63.147.0/24
descr: webhosting
origin: AS42741
mnt-by: ALEXANDRU-NET-TM-MNT
source: RIPE # Filtered

route: 82.192.64.0/19
descr: LEASEWEB
origin: AS16265
remarks: Leaseweb
mnt-by: OCOM-MNT
source: RIPE # Filtered

Tuesday, March 6, 2012

Messin with CaseFile

Less than a month ago Paterva (makers of Maltego) went live with their first release of CaseFile - software for tracking entities and their relationships. This is a great tool for tracking relationships gathered within open-source intelligence (OS-INT). My intention is not to advertise a particular company or tool, but to discuss what is available and what people are using for tracking OS-INT. Gathering and tracking OS-INT is something that we do frequently as security researchers. A good example of using information in the public domain to gain a clearer picture of a threat was in the MSUpdater Trojan report we released in late January. Admittedly so, my organization of OS-INT could be better - I frequently make notes to myself in SlipBox or some text editor as well as track well formated data in spreadsheets or databases. So I'm always on the hunt for new tools to help facilitate this as well as add some visualization to my data to better see and understand relationships. I received a lot of feedback on a past blog that I did about using The Brain to visualize web transactions and other security related information - so I figured that I'd share what I've learned with CaseFile here.

Paterva is nice enough to provide a free community edition (CE) of CaseFile for the general public to use (commercial use requires a license). I've been messing around with CaseFile here and there for the last month for non-commercial use to get a feel for its capabilities. It has a nice interface for visually adding and linking entities as well as the ability to import Excel and CSV spreadsheets into the interface.

These are some snapshots of a CaseFile that I created to track the information in the recent Contagio blogpost on a targeted attack leveraging the recent CVE-2012-0754 Flash vulnerability.

My sample can be downloaded here:
  • CaseFile MTGX file format
  • Zoomable PNG file format
Here are some of the Pros & Cons that I have found using it.

Pros:
  • Easy to use, no need to read a manual or have a large number of menu options to navigate
  • Visual organization of entities and links with auto organize features (e.g., block, hierarchical, circular, organic)
  • A number of useful pre-built entities in the palette
  • Ability to import CSV and Excel
  • Ability to create links to files and sites
  • Visually appealing! Your boss or customer will love the output
  • Inexpensive commercial license
Cons:
  • Uses a proprietary data format (MTGX file) and has no way of exporting to XML, JSON, database or any other parseable format. So any data that you add into the graph can't really be extracted out (e.g., to create things like backlists). You can export to a zoomable PNG for others without CaseFile to view.
  • No programatic way of entering data into CaseFile (in Maltego this is done through what are called transforms) - best is to programmatically generate CSV files that can then be imported into CaseFile to visualize.
  • Missing a number of entities that I figured would be default, such as a File.
  • Unclear how to visually show temporal / time-based meta-data or sequential ordering (best I found was color coding links)
  • The auto-zoom with the Mac trackpad takes a little bit of getting used to, and there were a few hick-ups on the Mac version where I couldn't select certain links.
  • I couldn't find an "undo" button so I had to re-build a part of the graph that I messed up
Note: some of these "cons" can be solved by using Maltego - however, the commercial license cost for Maltego is about 4x more expensive than CaseFile and your work sits on Paterva's servers.

What do others that are reading this use for tracking and visualizing OS-INT and entity relationships? Particularly related to incident info and is free/affordable (I'm aware of companies that specialize is this type of software, and their licenses are not cheap)? I recently stumbled over an older open-source project called Netglub - it doesn't seem to really be maintained anymore (1.0 release back in 2010 with no recent updates) and the source is C++/Qt. This project appeared to be aimed at creating an open-sourced clone of Maltego. I like the idea of an open-source OS-INT tool with an open data-format like XML so that various things can understand and read/write to the program. On my own time I have been messing with putting together some Ruby code to build a prototype of something simple - once I get a good base I'll open up the code ... but before I got ahead of myself, I wanted to get any feedback on this subject that I could.

Friday, November 18, 2011

Facebook Password mal-spam campaign

I'm seeing a lot of emails today with attachments like: Facebook_Password_#8071.zip
where the number changes to avoid spam detection.

The email message looks like:
From: "Facebook"
Subject: Facebook Service# Your account has been blocked! Order/1721
Body:
The .zip file has MD5: 1aa99870a5ca6f0bb6d3cbe4d19f0fab
VirusTotal report (15/42)

The unzipped "Facebook_Password.exe" has MD5: 777b4261072c763786c331f4e1cba70b
VirusTotal report (7/40)

Once executed it does a DNS lookup to:
sandhuforgings.co.uk
And HTTP GET request to:
klon77290.ru //ixo/index.php?cmd=getgrab
(188.247.232.139 )
This downloads an encoded/encrypted file "174" MD5: c5f7073ce2ef79965b0c152201dd68b9
(presumably its config)

Directory indexing is on for the sandhuforgings.co.uk website, and malicious files are accessible from the /images directory:

dd.exe:
- MD5: 174ab94e2e91afb7b9020db831d15905
- V/T report 2/42
- Checks into kkosokoko.ru (188.247.232.139) and forumrostov.ru (89.149.223.25)
sp.exe:
- MD5: 4f033af57f4e17cf150b103da508a677
- V/T report 1/42
1.exe:
- MD5: 6cd1f9963d0d53215a8cb23eb23508ea
- V/T report 10/42

These are likely updates or additional malware to be downloaded.

Updates to come as I continue my analysis...

Tuesday, November 8, 2011

Investigating "Info.zip" mal-spam campaign

We're seeing a large number of spam emails advertising links ending in:

"/Info.zip?" some parameters, e.g., n=033-5834, id=4561392, 1091-2905, etc.


The spam message arrives in a variety of different languages, presumably attempting to guess the native language of the recipient and/or evade spam detection. The order Id used in the subject, message, and link varies in every message to attempt to evade spam detection. The messages translate to:

"Your order has been accepted.
Id Order 1947-210.
Terms of delivery and the date can be found in the self-generated MSWord file."

The ZIP is detected by a few A/V vendors, for example:
MD5: 30b9a90029e129a6114dae7bce8a15c6
V/T report (11/41)

Once unzipped the Trojan appears as an 83 character filename:
Info.Doc_________~snip~__________.exe
MD5: 19f6d8f565d465f3ee9c03881cbc3893
V/T report (12/43)

From what we've seen so far, the MD5 for the malware samples are all the same. The binary executable is UPX packed, and drops "5ee2fffe0001a11d.exe" (or similar hexadecimal filename) to the user's temp directory and is set to run at startup. It then checks in:

POSTing infection details to:
hxxp://heppishopdrm.ru/stat/image.php

And retrieving an update from:
hxxp://www.familytindoor.net/dbs/0090_2.exe
MD5: 4d02fbd17529a1fc867d991c6fd22b61
V/T report (28/42) - goes by a few names: Trojan Lebag, Graftor.
which checks into: duffiduffii.ru/dbs/logo90.php, likely for an encrypted config:

We have seen these sites utilize five IPs in round-robin with a short TTL of 300 (fast-flux). IPs seen so far, include:
67.40.211.116 (AS209 - QWEST)
60.19.30.135 (AS4837 - CN UNICOM-LN)
218.24.113.3 (AS4837 - CN UNICOM-LN)
205.185.117.149 (AS18779 - PONYNET)
82.210.157.9 (AS12476 - ASTERCITYNET)
122.194.5.110 (AS4837 - CN UNICOM-LN)

Google results for many of the IPs show a recent history of C&C abuse for cyber-crime (Zeus and SpyEye)

The malware domains were recently registered and currently utilizes the nameservers:
ns1.locatormate.net
ns1.anzbankingnz.net
Which both currently point to 108.59.35.213 (AS32413 - North Texas Connect) - this IP has an October 2011 Spamhaus SBL advisory listed for it related to SpyEye. Other domains using these nameservers should be treated as suspicious/malicious.

The "familytindoor.net" domain was recently registered with this information and gmail address:

Here's a list of what we have seen spammed out so far related to this campaign (most/all of these are not yet in any blacklist and appear to be compromised sites):
hxxp://www.dentalinn.it/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://jump-float.org/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://www.dentalinn.it/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://www.dogvillage.it/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://modsart.in/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://fattoconamore.it/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://www.la-vecchia-cantina.it/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://evacuazione.com/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://marcobasile.com/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://knuttisportebike.it/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://modsart.in/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://leoparquet.it/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://funimont.it/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://eskilito.com/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://duediemme.it/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://cosmick.it/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://www.lasoluzione.it/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://www.enonsolofiori.it/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://www.enonsolofiori.it/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://www.dogvillage.it/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://villamontesiro.com/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://reginaisabella.org/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://marcobasile.com/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://leoparquet.it/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://jump-float.org/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://fattoconamore.it/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://cosmick.it/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://www.lasoluzione.it/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://villamontesiro.com/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://eskilito.com/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://arcocurvatrici.com/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://www.la-vecchia-cantina.it/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://funimont.it/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://reginaisabella.org/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://duediemme.it/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://evacuazione.com/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://arcocurvatrici.com/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://www.villamontesiro.com/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://www.reginaisabella.org/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://www.professionalsolution.eu/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://www.fattoconamore.it/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://www.castellocamemi.com/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://knuttisportebike.it/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://www.tennisbardolino.com/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://www.palazzosgamati.com/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://www.modsart.in/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://www.marcobasile.com/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://www.marcobasile.com/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://www.leoparquet.it/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://www.knuttisportebike.it/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://www.jump-float.org/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://www.hipparcos.it/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://www.goaldiretta.it/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://www.funimont.it/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://www.docla.it/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://www.cosmick.it/downloads/kantoor/Info.zip
hxxp://www.andreabovo.it/downloads/azienda/Info.zip
hxxp://radionotizie.biz/downloads/azienda/Info.zip

I will make updates to this post as I continue my analysis.